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COMMENTARY: STRATIFIED SCARCITY
AND UNFAIR LIABILITY
E. Haavi Morreim*
INTRODUCTION
PROFESSOR FURROW offers three basic arguments supporting
his conclusion that physicians should not be explicitly permitted
to invoke costs as a defense to substandard care.1 First, he suggests
that cost constraints need not imply diminished quality of care. In-
ordinate concern with the uncertainties of medicine has in some
cases led to the overuse of medical technology, which produces ia-
trogenic injuries and diagnostic false positives, leading, in turn, to
further needless and sometimes harmful interventions. Further, by
working with-and sometimes against-hospitals and other institu-
tional providers, physicians can help to identify more efficient ways
of delivering care and where necessary can combat those allocation
mechanisms which work to patients' disadvantage. Cost considera-
tions are not alien to standards of care; they need only to be incor-
porated in benign ways.
Second, Professor Furrow argues that the law already permits
considerable shelter for the inclusion of cost concerns into stan-
dards of care. Since the standard of care in tort law mirrors medi-
cal practice by appealing to prevailing custom, an economic shift
downward in custom will be reflected in commensurately reduced
tort standards. Moreover, there are several ways in which economi-
cal deviations from custom are permitted. Where a physician can
demonstrate that his more conservative approach leads to compara-
ble medical results, a court may accept this deviation from custom
as a respectable minority approach, as a legitimate use of the physi-
cian's best judgment where medical standards vary, or as a clinical
innovation. In addition, the available resources caveat of the local-
* Assistant Professor, College of Medicine, University of Tennessee, Memphis. B.A.,
St. Olaf College (1972); M.A. (1976), Ph.D. (1980), University of Virginia.
The author acknowledges with gratitude the helpful comments provided by Barry Fur-
row, J.D.; Robert Banks, J.D.; William Appelgate, M.D.; Alan Bisno, M.D.; Rand Rosen-
blatt, J.D., and Dan Brock, Ph.D.
1. Professor Furrow also largely rejects costs as a defense for hospital liability. How-
ever, in my Commentary, I shall focus only on the issue as it concerns physicians.
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ity rule can excuse the failure to use a technology which is not lo-
cally available. And, where patients agree at the time of entry into
a particular health care delivery system (e.g., an HMO) to abide by
its cost-control provisions, the informed consent rule offers some
shelter where those provisions are carried out in good faith, medi-
cally credible ways.
Finally, Professor Furrow argues that society will be better
served if tort law maintains pressures on health care providers to
view patient welfare as the top priority. The battles of cost contain-
ment should be fought not at the bedside but rather in administra-
tive offices, in board rooms, and in legislative chambers. To permit
cost constraints as a liability defense may make it too easy for physi-
cians to compromise patient care instead of undertaking the effort
to streamline medical standards and to improve resource availabil-
ity and allocation.
There is much here with which we can agree. Previously, lush
third-party reimbursement policies, together with physicians' dis-
comfort about medical and legal uncertainties, engendered medical
practices which probably are considerably inflated above the re-
quirements of good health care. Surely, "less" does not necessarily
mean "worse" in medical care. Likewise, physicians ought stub-
bornly to resist abridging their fiduciary commitments to patients in
order to serve third parties' economic interests. The forces of cost
containment have advocates aplenty; if the patient does not have his
own physician as his advocate, he may have no one.
However, I shall argue that Professor Furrow's analysis skirts
an important class of cases whose exigencies we must face squarely.
Not all physicians will be able to meet economic constraints harm-
lessly by streamlining clinical routines, and not all battles against
administrators and legislators can be won. As I shall show in Sec-
tion I, economic constraints in health care are not distributed uni-
formly throughout society, but rather fall especially hard upon the
poor-a situation of "stratified scarcity." As a result, those physi-
cians who attend the poor will, at times, have no choice but to pro-
vide care which falls below the standards of the majority.
Traditional legal escape hatches identified by Professor Furrow are
closed to these physicians and, as a consequence, they may be held
legally liable for factors largely outside their control. This situation
constitutes what I shall call "morally unfair legal liability." In Sec-
tion II, I will explore this notion of unfair liability, arguing that,
although in some situations unfair liability may be justified, we can-
not entirely justify imposing it in these circumstances.
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I. STRATIFIED SCARCITY
A. Economic Factors
Health care expenditures in the United States have increased
dramatically in recent years-out of control, some would argue.
Per capita expenditures have nearly trebled since 1950,2 rising from
five to eleven percent of the Gross National Product (GNP) since
1960.1 Of special interest, Medicare's Hospital Fund could be
bankrupt by as early as 1992, salvageable only if current levels of
service are cut by some twenty percent or if funding is commensu-
rately increased.' This economic pressure is sure to be compounded
by budget cutbacks as Congress attempts to reduce the national def-
icit. At the same time, powerful lobbying efforts are beginning to
expand Medicare's coverage to include both organ transplants and
broader reimbursement for catastrophic disease.5
Medicaid services for the nation's indigent are unlikely to fare
better. Costs, as elsewhere in the health care industry, have spiraled
rapidly upward, and states have taken numerous measures to limit
their expenses.6 Further, new pressures are prompting Medicaid to
expand its eligibility guidelines. Not all indigent people are eligible
for Medicaid coverage, with specific criteria varying from state to
state.7
Until the recent past, those who were not covered were accom-
modated in the health care system through "costshifting," under
which providers raised their charges to paying patients in order to
cover indigent-care losses. However, this device is now disappear-
ing as insurance companies and corporations, anxious to reduce
their own burgeoning health care outlays, are removing themselves
from the reach of cost shifting through such special arrangements
as preferred provider organizations, health maintenance organiza-
2. See H. AARON & W. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION (1984).
3. See Thurow, Learning to Say 'No, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1559, 1569 (1984).
4. See Panel Warns of Medicare Bankruptcy in Mid-90's, Am. Med. News, Apr. 11,
1986, at 9.
5. See Blumenthal, Schlesinger, Drumheller & the Harvard Medicare Project, The Fu-
ture of Medicare, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 722 (1986); Panel to Advise HHS on Catastrophic
Plans, Am. Med. News, Mar. 14, 1986, at 20; McIlrath, Catastrophic Plans in Spotlight, Am.
Med. News, Mar. 7, 1986, at 1, 40, 41; Medicare to Fund Some Heart Transplants, Am. Med.
News, July 18, 1986, at 18.
6. See Study Cites Innovative State Actions to Control Hospital/Cost, Am. Med. News,
June 14, 1985, at 25-26; Scheier, States Eye DRG Pay for Medicaid, Am. Med. News, Sept. 6,
1985, at 2, 22.
7. See Blendon, Aiken, Freeman, Kinkman-Liff & Murphy, Uncompensated Care by
Hospitals or Public Insurance for the Poor: Does it Make a Difference?, 314 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1160, 1161 (1986).
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tions, and independent practice associations.' As a result, an esti-
mated thirty to thirty-five million medically uninsured people must
now be either included within existing indigent-care programs, find
new sources of help, or do without.'
The conclusion here is not difficult to draw. Resources with
which to care for the poor are significantly less than those available
to care for the nonpoor, and this situation is likely to be exacerbated
in the future. Economists have suggested that we may see the emer-
gence of as many as four tiers of health care: "tourist class" care for
those on government support, "business class" care for employees
of corporations, "boutique medicine" for the wealthy, and, at the
bottom, possibly little or no care for those who lack support from
anyone.10 We face not a uniform, society-wide scarcity of health
care resources, but "stratified scarcity," as constraints on resources
become increasingly severe with descending socioeconomic status.
B. Risk Trade-Offs
To some extent, perhaps generally, physicians who attend the
poor can cope with resource scarcity in just those ways which Pro-
fessor Furrow has identified. They can ferret out the excesses in
clinical routines, and they can battle for more equitable allocation.
Such efforts are arguably an important part of physicians' fiduciary
responsibilities, and they must be energetic and unrelenting to avert
needless diminutions in the quality of care.
And yet there are limits. So long as there are distinctly fewer
economic resources for the care of indigent people, their physicians
will be more constrained than other physicians. The differences will
not necessarily be dramatic, as in the textbook rationing cases
which ask us to decide who shall receive a lifesaving resource and
8. See McIlrath, Uncompensated Care Needs More Attention, Am. Med. News, Oct. 4,
1985, at 32.
9. See Cancila, Care of Indigents Called Critical Issue, Am. Med. News, Feb. 21, 1986,
at 1, 30; Scheier, Burden of Indigent Care Shifted to States, Am. Med. News, Jan. 3, 1986, at
6, 7; Scheier, Medically Indigent Get New Aid, Am. Med. News, Jan. 10, 1986 at 2, 34. For a
discussion of the ways in which California's recent Medi-Cal cutbacks have adversely affected
access and quality of health care for the indigent, see Schneider & Stern, Health Maintenance
Organizations and the Poor, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 90, 127 (1975); Waitzkin, Two-Class Medicine
Returns to the United States, 2 LANCET 1144 (1984); Lurie, Ward, Shapiro & Brook, Termi-
nation from Medi-Cal-Does it Affect Health, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 480 (1984); Lurie,
Ward, Shapiro, Gallego, Vahaiwalla & Brook, Termination of Medi-Cal Benefits, 314 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1266 (1986).
10. See Scheier, State Role in Caring for Needy Is Seen Increasing, Am. Med. News,
Aug. 23, 1985, at 2, 16; Thurow, Medicine Versus Economics, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 611
(1985).
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who will be sent away to his doom. Rather, we are more likely to
see simply a shift in the ways in which risks and benefits are
weighed. Professor Furrow aptly describes one side of this balance.
Where physicians engage in overly aggressive diagnostic and thera-
peutic interventions in order to ease their uncertainties, iatrogenic
harms can result, and diagnostic false positives can lead to further
needless interventions. If physicians are willing both to undertake
research to reduce such uncertainties (e.g., providing clearer indica-
tions for such procedures as tonsillectomy and hysterectomy) and
to tolerate a higher measure of ambiguity in the clinical setting,
many of these injuries and needless expenses could be avoided.
There is, however, another side. Insofar as they are undertaken
in order to reduce uncertainty, these "marginal" tests and therapies
aim to avoid another sort of harm: failure to help the patient, either
by failure to diagnose or by failure to treat adequately. Thus,
although eliminating such interventions can reduce the risk of ia-
trogenic injury to some patients, the risk of failing to help other
patients reciprocally increases. And it is usually impossible to know
in advance whose welfare is being traded for whose. Thus, when a
physician engages in "minimal medicine," as Professor Furrow has
labelled it, he may in fact compromise the care of his own patient
for the sake of other patients' medical or economic benefit. This is
not to say that such tradeoffs cannot or should not be made-only
that they must be acknowledged and directly addressed.
Insofar as their more limited resources constrain them to prac-
tice even more "minimal" medicine than their more well-funded
brethren, the physicians who attend the poor will be forced to make
comparatively more of these tradeoffs. And they will more often be
"guilty" of failure to help. Some examples will illustrate.
-Public General Hospital (PGH) has no CT scanner of its own,
and so must refer its patients who need this resource to the private
hospital across town. That hospital, however, will only accept a
limited number of PGH patients since, after all, this service is pro-
vided largely as a charity, and the private hospital's charity budget
is not unlimited. Physicians at PGH, therefore, must limit the
number of patients for whom they request CT to those in the most
urgent need, particularly on evenings and weekends when the pri-
vate hospital has reduced staff. Inevitably, there will be indigent
patients at PGH who, if they were private, paying patients, would
receive a CT scan, but who in fact will not on the grounds that
other PGH patients are in greater need. In some of these cases, the
patient's illness will as a result remain undiagnosed and inade-
10371986]
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quately treated. Because the standard controlling when a CT scan
is clinically indicated at the private hospital and elsewhere would
have encompassed such patients, their care, or lack of care, is
substandard.
While we can suggest, with Professor Furrow, that computer-
ized tomography is perhaps overused, we must still reckon with the
fact that, once the medical community agrees upon more conserva-
tive indications for its use, the patients at PGH will almost certainly
still be subject to a yet more conservative protocol. And some PGH
patients will suffer as a result.11
-Patient Smith is admitted to PGH with symptoms suggesting
possible meningitis. Physician Jones performs a lumbar puncture,
knowing that its culture results may be negative, since the patient's
local medical doctor placed him on antibiotics before referring him
to PGH. Therefore, Dr. Jones must simply choose an antibiotic
which he hopes will eradicate the organism. The infection could be
viral, in which case no antibiotic will be of use. And the infection
may not be meningitis. Dr. Jones must, however, presume that
there may be a bacterial meningitis and must initiate treatment,
since untreated meningitis can lead quickly to major morbidity or to
death.
An ordinary, inexpensive antibiotic, such as penicillin, would
probably suffice, since it is broad spectrum and capable of treating
the most common organisms in adults. However, since the organ-
ism is unidentified, Dr. Jones is uncertain. At more affluent hospi-
tals, many physicians would routinely prescribe a third-generation
cephalosporin, since they, too, are broad spectrum, but enter the
cerebro-spinal fluid more easily, and can deal especially well with
the more obstinate gram-negative organisms. However, physicians
at PGH must hesitate. These latter antibiotics can cost the hospital
well over a thousand dollars for an adult's ten-day course, just for
the drug alone. In addition, PGH has a policy which discourages
the use of a third-generation cephalosporin under these conditions.
PGH only stocks a certain amount of such expensive commodities,
and they must be shepherded carefully. Dr. Jones could, if he in-
sisted, obtain the expensive antibiotic for his patient. But as he and
his colleagues at PGH have agreed, it is best to save these for cases
where the need is clear. If it is used in this case, the supply may not
11. Another side of this problem is that PGH patients receive their diagnostic evalua-
tions more slowly than patients elsewhere. Lesser availability of testing equipment can lead
to longer waiting periods and, thereby, to further medical deterioration before a diagnosis is
made and treatment initiated.
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be there for patients who more clearly need it. Furthermore, if
PGH physicians routinely started using the restricted drugs in the
less than clear cases such as this one, then the supply would surely
run short. 1
2
One can argue, as does Professor Furrow, that third-generation
cephalosporins are generally overused-giving rise to the danger of
creating resistant organisms and to the resulting need for still
stronger, more expensive antibiotics. However, it is quite possible
that more conservative criteria would still recommend that physi-
cians prescribe the cephalosporin when he suspects meningitis of
unknown etiology. If this is the case, then the physicians at PGH
will still sometimes be practicing substandard medicine. Admit-
tedly, most of their patients will recover anyway. But occasionally
a patient will suffer grave neurological damage, or perhaps die, be-
cause of an inadequately treated infection.
C. Medical and Moral Factors
It has been suggested in response to such cost-containment di-
lemmas that people other than the physician ought to make the
tradeoff decisions. The physician should be guided, so the argu-
ment goes, solely by the benefit of his patient, while others should
impose the economic limitations upon him. In this way, the physi-
cian can offer the patient his undivided loyalty.13 In concert with
this view, Professor Furrow suggests, for example, that hospitals
and other health care institutions should now be the "primary care
giver," bearing principal responsibility for allocation policies and
for medical error. Physicians can thereby be substantially freed
from the need to engage in "bedside budget balancing."
Hospitals can, of course, establish useful guidelines for cost-ef-
12. One might argue that the physician should initiate treatment with the more potent
antibiotic until laboratory culture results return information about the infectious organism's
identity. However, those results may be falsely negative, as indicated in the example. Where
this is so, or where the lab services are slow or unreliable, the physician must still decide
under diagnostic uncertainty whether to use the antibiotic in borderline cases such as this, or
to reserve it for a clearer need.
13. See Levinsky, The Doctor's Master, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED 1573 (1984); R.
VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHics (1981). Veatch, for example, believes that we
should make it "impossible for the physician to order the sixth stool guaiac." Id. at 285. He
is referring to a 1975 study by Neuhauser and Lewicki which showed that in screening for
colon cancer, the marginal cost of the sixth serial guaiac test is $50 million for each new
cancer detected. See 239 NEW ENG. J. MED. 226. Veatch goes on to argue that the physi-
cian should not be responsible for eliminating interventions of even infinitesimal benefit on
grounds of costs; others must make such decisions. See also Veatch, DRGs and the Ethical
Reallocation of Resources, 16 HAsTINGS CENTER REP., June 1986, at 32.
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fective care. Some, for example, have developed a two-tier phar-
macy system under which the most expensive medications can be
prescribed only by physicians of the relevant subspecialties, who in
turn develop criteria to guide their decisions. Thus, a general prac-
titioner would have to consult with the infectious disease service if
he wished his patient to receive an expensive antibiotic.
Up to a point, such guidance is desirable. Economically effec-
tive, medically benign cost containment is probably best achieved
through collective reasoning and concerted action rather than
through individuals' idiosyncratic economic reasoning implemented
at the bedside.
However, such guidelines are of limited value. Medicine is en-
tirely too complex, uncertain, and rapidly changing, and patients
are too diverse in their physical, psychological, and value structure,
to permit any committee, computer, or cookbook to designate pre-
cisely which interventions are medically and economically war-
ranted under which circumstances. Ultimately, health care is not
delivered by administrators or by boards of directors to groups of
patients; it is provided by individual physicians to individual pa-
tients. There is no substitute for the professional observation, inter-
pretation, and judgment which can only be exercised by the
individual physician in the clinical setting. Any administrator who
routinely proposed to dictate such daily details as which patients
should receive how many chest X-rays or lab studies, who needs
invasive monitoring, or who can be safely discharged, would be
practicing medicine in the physician's stead. In the final analysis,
physicians must largely retain the clinical authority to pursue the
interests of each patient as an individual, determining both which
interventions to offer to whom and when to warrant exceptions to
applicable guidelines.
By implication, however, the existence of resource scarcity
means that not every patient can receive every optimally desirable
intervention and that whoever has the power to say "yes" will also
bear some responsibility to say "no." Although in any individual
case the physician can attempt to secure fully optimal care for his
own patient-as, for example, by bypassing local policy and pre-
scribing the expensive antibiotic in the second example discussed
above-justice requires that if a distribution plan is fair and effec-
tive, those physicians subject to it should try to comply with its
restrictions in good faith most of the time. Excessive exceptions can
quickly destroy even the best of allocation plans. And this means
that, at times, the physician must say no to his own patients even
1040 [VCol. 36:1033
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where he knows that he could, with appropriate cajoling of co-
workers or embellishment of facts, secure benefits for them which
the system could not possibly afford to all other similarly situated
patients. 14
It is a responsibility from which the physician morally must not
shrink. Justice requires that, where resources are scarce, each per-
son avail himself of them in ways that do not unduly deplete them
for others' use. Thus, physicians ought not to dip excessively into
common resources to secure their own patients' welfare, even for
the admittedly important sake of their fiduciary commitment to pa-
tients. Neither should the physician seek to relinquish his clinical
control-i.e., to escape the responsibility of saying no by systemati-
cally inviting others to place restrictions on his clinical decision
making so that he can absolve himself of the conflicts involved in
weighing patients' interests against competing economic concerns.
To do this would be to forsake one of the most important moral
commitments of the professional relationship. In order to be re-
sponsible to his patients' needs, the physician must first BE RE-
SPONSIBLE." He must ensure that he is in a position to aid his
patients, and this requires that he retain as much clinical authority
as possible. Thus, to state the reciprocal: to avoid the uneasy task
of saying "no" would require relinquishing the power to say "yes."
This fact-namely, that the physician is unavoidably a key
agent of resource allocation who must sometimes say no even where
he could probably secure the good in question-will prove to be of
tremendous importance as we consider below how the legal system
should respond to physicians who practice under the most seriously
limited resources.
14. For further discussion of these justice issues see Morreim, Cost Containment: Issues
of Moral Conflict and Justice for Physicians, 6 THEORETICAL MED. 257 (1985). For further
discussion of hospitals' increasing assumption of liability for medical error, see Note, Re-
thinking Medical Malpractice Law in Light of Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1004
(1985). The author recommends adopting a rebuttable presumption that hospitals be held
jointly liable wherever inadequate care has led to injury. Whatever the theoretical merits of
this approach, and whatever the benefit to physicians' insurance companies as they share
more of the damage assessments with hospital defendants, physicians themselves will be
helped little by this plan. They must still ultimately make the specific health care decisions
for each patient, and therefore must still bear responsibility before the law. Their liability is
not changed, only the range of company with whom they share that liability.
15. For further discussion of the professional ethics of medicine, see E. PELLEGRINO &
D. THOMASMA, A PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE (1981). For further dis-
cussion of the highly individual nature of clinical practice, see Gorovitz & Maclntyre, To-
ward a Theory of Medical Fallibility, 1 J. MED. & PHIL. 51 (1976).
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D. Legal Factors
Where physicians are able to economize on care in the medically
benign ways discussed by Professor Furrow, they can appeal to an
assortment of legal devices for judicial blessing. As we shall now
see, however, those devices are of little or no avail for the physicians
whose economically necessitated deviations from custom lead not to
a comparable, but to a lesser, quality of care.
1. Custom
Even if physicians as a group are able to shift downward their
customs as Professor Furrow suggests (traversing a legally hazard-
ous transition period in which early efforts will expose individual
physicians to potentially substantial liability),16 those physicians
who attend the poor are likely to be left behind. So long as scarcity
of health care resources is stratified, with significantly less available
for the poor, and so long as this group is numerically a minority of
the population, then a legal reliance upon the majority's custom in
establishing standards of care is sure to leave these physicians vul-
nerable. The law will expect them to deliver a level of care which
their resources simply will not afford.
2. Respectable Minority, Best Judgment, and Clinical Innovation
The traditional means by which the legally acceptable excep-
tions to custom are drawn will likewise be of little help. Courts
accept the actions of a respectable minority, as well as the best judg-
ment or clinical innovations of individual physicians, only so long
as these serve the basic principle by which standards of medical care
are set in tort law: the patient's welfare must be promoted at least
as well by the variant care as by the custom. Courts have permitted
or required changes in prevailing practices only to improve or pre-
serve quality of care, never (knowingly) to diminish it. 17
16. See Kapp, Legal and Ethical Implications of Health Care Reimbursement by Diagno-
sis Related Groups, 12 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 245, 250 (1984); Bovbjerg, The Medical
Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs and Customary Practice, 1975 DUKE L. J. 1375, 1377;
Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutional Legal, and Policy Analysis, in
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BI-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 3 SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 349
(1983).
17. See, eg., Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, (Wash. 1974); The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d
737 (2d Cir. 1937); Note, supra note 14, at 1018.
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3. Informed Consent
Neither will the informed consent rule suffice, contrary to those
who advocate its use in this context.18 In principal, these advocates
suggest, informed consent in this setting can enhance patient auton-
omy and preserve the fiduciary relationship. As the physician in-
forms the patient that a particular intervention is medically
desirable but not available under his health care coverage, the pa-
tient can then decide whether to purchase the intervention using his
personal resources or whether to try politically to alter the rule
under which the resource is denied.
Unfortunately, this theory works only when both of two condi-
tions are fulfilled: the resource unavailability must be the product
of outside parties' decisions rather than of the physician's own
drawing of priorities among limited resources; and the patient must
have sufficient funds to purchase the care or enough political influ-
ence to alter the policy. Where the patient cannot alter the situa-
tion, his autonomy is not necessarily enhanced by the knowledge
that his care is inferior. And where it is the physician himself who
has decided (however justifiably) that the resource is better used
elsewhere, physician-patient trust may be jeopardized, not
enhanced.
"Ms. Jones, I just want you to know that this hospital is truly sec-
ond-rate- inadequate nursing staff, badly outdated diagnostic fa-
cilities, and such. And although I think you'd benefit quite a bit
from physical therapy, I've decided not to prescribe it for you-
they're awfully busy, you know, and other patients need it more
than you. Just thought you'd like to know..."
While Professor Furrow shares this skepticism concerning the
helpfulness of the informed consent rule in this context of clinical
decision making, he is more optimistic about the prospects of in-
forming patients at the point of entry about the particular cost-con-
tainment policies of the health care plan which they contemplate
joining. This optimism is not entirely warranted. It is all very well
for an HMO to announce that it intends to save money by keeping
patients healthy and by caring for them on an outpatient basis
whenever it is safe to do so. However, it is impossible to enumerate
in advance for the prospective plan participant all the specific cost
tradeoffs which might affect him. First, except where the patient
18. See, eg., Blumstein, supra note 16, at 389ff; Kapp, supra note 16, at 251; Marsh,
Health Care Cost Containment and the Duty to Treat, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 157, 177-78 (1985);
A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 285 (2d ed. 1978); Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash.
App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (Wash. 1974).
10431986]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
already has a chronic illness, it may be impossible to predict which
particular illnesses he will likely develop, and thus equally impossi-
ble to discuss in advance the sort of cost savings which might be
contemplated for his personal care. Therefore, if the thirty-nine-
year-old man in Professor Furrow's first example had not yet devel-
oped his cardiac arrhythmias upon initial entry into the HMO, it is
unlikely that he would have discussed this particular cost-benefit
decision in advance. If he develops the illness after becoming a
member, the cost discussion will not fit Professor Furrow's model.
The man has enrolled relying on the representation that the HMO
will provide all his needed medications, yet now it asks him to agree
to a somewhat less-than-optimal therapy in order to save the corpo-
ration some money. While the patient may perhaps decide that it is
prudent for him to consider the HMO's fiscal welfare, we surely
cannot say that he agreed up front to such a tradeoff.
Other important facts about the particular health care plan are
also unlikely to be revealed, partly because there are too many of
them and perhaps occasionally because they are not too savory.
For example, the unrevealed statistic may be that an HMO's desig-
nated hospital performs fewer than 100 coronary bypass operations
per year, thus exposing its patients to considerably higher levels of
risk than hospitals who perform them more routinely.' 9 And again,
as above, unless the particular nature of the cost tradeoff has been
quite explicitly discussed in advance, it is difficult to argue that the
patient has agreed to it simply by virtue of his joining the
organization.
4. The Locality Rule
Neither can the physician be rescued by the "resources caveat"
of the locality rule.20 While this rule can, for example, excuse an
obstetrician for failure to perform ultrasonography in a high-risk
pregnancy where no ultrasound equipment is available within a rea-
sonable distance, the locality concept does not apply to resource
variations within a particular locality. More specifically, while it
speaks to the unavailability of resources, the rule does not encom-
pass conscious decisions to refrain from using available resources-
regardless how justified those decisions may be morally and eco-
nomically. Nor does it encompass variations in the quality of care
19. See Cancila, HCFA Data Release Gets Mixed Reactions, Am. Med. News, Mar. 28,
1986, at 1, 32.
20. See Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, (Miss. 1985).
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which arise, not from the patient's geographic location, but from his
socioeconomic station.
5. Loss of a Chance
Finally, the "loss of a chance" doctrine not only is unlikely to
help the physician, but could in principle threaten to thwart cost-
containment efforts quite systematically. As noted in Section IB
above, efforts to reduce costs by "streamlining" medicine carry cer-
tain tradeoffs. To reduce the use of a particular marginal interven-
tion may reduce iatrogenic injuries and diagnostic false positives in
some patients, but only at the cost of failing to help other patients.
These latter patients could invoke the "loss of a chance" doctrine to
argue that, but for the deviation from custom, their illnesses would
have been better diagnosed and treated, thus averting whatever
harms occurred from this failure. In this way, virtually any attempt
toward "minimal medicine" could be stopped cold in its tracks.
E. Summary
Though all physicians face legal risks as they cope with cost
constraints, physicians who attend the poor are likely to be in a
virtually impossible predicament. With fewer resources available to
care for their patients than those available to the majority of pa-
tients, these physicians will nevertheless be legally held to the level
of care offered to that majority. Thus, these physicians are quite
sure to be subjected to what I shall call "morally unfair legal liabil-
ity." They will be held legally liable for the medical consequences
of economic decisions to which they had no reasonable alternative.
They will be penalized for a failure to do the virtually impossible.
Morally and legally, this situation presents a challenge from which
we must not shrink.
II. UNFAIR LIABILITY
A. The Concept
Ever since Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw asked in
1850 whether Mr. Kendall was at fault when he accidentally struck
Mr. Brown while separating two fighting dogs, American tort law
has incorporated a systematic interest in the moral notion of blame-
worthiness.2" In distributing the costs of mishaps, it seems morally
21. See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850); see also G. WHrrE, TORT
LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HisToRY 14-16 (1980); Williams, Abandoning Medi-
cal Malpractice, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 549, 554.
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inappropriate that an innocent victim should suffer a loss which was
culpably caused by someone else's intentional or negligent
conduct.
22
It is a challenge, of course, to define "fault." We might, for
example, look for a subjective standard of personal moral blame-
worthiness, or alternatively for a more objective standard of appro-
priate conduct.2 3 Nevertheless, we can usually agree on the more
clear-cut cases, as where a surgeon consumes a substantial quantity
of alcohol just prior to operating on a patient. We may not know
just how to define fault but, like obscenity, we usually know it when
we see it.2 4
Reciprocally, and more important for our purposes, we can also
agree that there is such a thing as "morally unfair legal liability," or
"unfair liability". In the paradigmatic situation, liability is imposed
on a defendant who could not possibly have foreseen or avoided the
mishap. Some applications of the doctrine of respondeat superior,
for example, may be morally unfair. Where an employer has taken
every reasonable precaution to screen his employees before hiring,
and trains and supervises them closely during employment, he is
hardly blameworthy when one of them suddenly and unexpectedly
goes berserk and drives the company truck through the fruit stand
to which he was to deliver a load of produce.
The unfairness of holding the employer liable anyway inheres in
the fact that he could not reasonably have averted the mishap. It
would be literally impossible for him to control all the physical
movements of each employee, and it would be unreasonable to ex-
pect him to hire someone to supervise every employee every minute
of each day (and to hire someone else to supervise the supervisor as
well.. .). "Ought implies can," as Kant has said, and the notion of
blameworthiness in this context presupposes that the person has the
power and responsibility to control the outcome-that he could and
should have done otherwise and, if he had, the problem would not
have occurred. Where this condition is not satisfied, the liability
seems morally unfair.
22. See Keeton & O'Connell, Why Shift Loss?, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 389 (J. Feinberg
& H. Gross eds. 1975); Harper & James, Accidents, Fault and Social Insurance, in FREEDOM
AND REsPONSIBILITY 267 (H. Morris ed. 1961); Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal
Law, in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra, at 273; Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts:
Their Scope and Limits: Part 1, 1 LAW & PHIL. 371, 373 (1982); ARISTOTLE,
NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS Book V (T. Taylor trans. 1918).
23. See Coleman, supra note 22, at 375; Keeton & O'Connell, supra note 22, at 389.
24. Cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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B. Justified Unfair Liability
To say that an imposition of liability is morally unfair, however,
does not necessarily mean that it is unjustified. Law is a crude in-
strument, and it is impossible to write laws which will assure just
and fair results with every application. To require a unanimous
jury of twelve members for a criminal conviction, for example, will
still result in a few convictions of the innocent. But to require una-
nimity among twenty or thirty people would, while convicting fewer
innocents, unduly encumber the legal system while allowing many
more dangerous and guilty offenders to go free. In short, it would
be unfair to society.25
As some unfair liability is inescapable, it may also be argued
that some of it can be philosophically justified. Strict liability with
respect to abnormally dangerous activities, for example, has been
defended on the ground that it provides extra incentive for those
introducing these risks to take superior precautions.26 Similarly,
strict liability for defective products is defended on the ground that
corporations can guard against risks and absorb losses better than
individuals.27
Admittedly, whether the concept of strict liability-liability in
the absence of fault in the form of intent or negligence-can be
philosophically justified in either criminal or civil law is highly con-
troversial.28 Fortunately, we need not resolve that issue here, nor
explore the equally knotty question of whether tort law ought to be
based on some comprehensive moral framework.29 For our pur-
poses, we need only specify the three prerequisites which would be
minimally necessary-whether or not any set of conditions could be
sufficient-in order to justify unfair liability.
First, there must be some important social aim served by the
overall rule of liability. Thus, the rule of respondeat superior is
25. See Wasserstrom, supra note 22, at 277-78.
26. See Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1974) (owner of vicious hog strictly
liable); Rylands v. Fletcher L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868); Koos v. Roth, 652 P.2d 1255 (Or. 1982);
Harper & James, supra note 22, at 268-69; Wasserstrom, supra note 22, at 276.
27. See Williams, supra note 21, at 564-65; MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y.
382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436
(1944); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962); for a
critical review of the strict liability principle, see Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
28. Wasserstrom, supra note 22; Harper & James, supra note 22; Calabresi, The Fairness
of the Fault System, in FREEDOM AND REsPONSIBILrrY, supra note 22, at 392-95; Coleman,
Moral Theories of Tort Their Scope and Limits: Part II, 2 LAw & PHIL. 5, 29 (1983).
29. See Williams, supra note 21, at 565; Coleman, supra note 22; Coleman, supra note
28; Steiner, Putting Fault Back into Products Liability, 1 LAw & PHIL. 419 (1982).
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designed to urge employers toward careful employment practice.
Second, there must be no reasonable way to write the liability rule
so as to avoid those cases in which the liability is imposed unfairly.
For example, while we generally hold competent adults responsible
for their conduct, and while we refrain from holding incompetent
individuals responsible, we must draw some sort of line between the
two. And we can be sure that, wherever we draw that line, there
will be borderline cases. As a result, we will inevitably apply the
adult standard of "ordinary prudence" to some individuals whose
intellectual capacities are at once too low to function quite nor-
mally, yet too high to warrant a designation of incompetence.3 0
Third, the merits of the social objective must outweigh the disad-
vantages of imposing the unfair liability. For example, we might
inquire whether the liability rule has the effect of placing undue bur-
dens upon socially desirable activities.31
C. Unjustified Unfair Liability
Professor Furrow argues that physicians ought not to be permit-
ted to plead prohibitive costs as a defense in malpractice litigation.
He states that, because medical practices are currently extravagent,
they can be trimmed in medically benign, even beneficial, ways.
This trimming, he suggests, can be accommodated by such tradi-
tional legal devices as the appeal to the "respectable minority,"
"best judgment," and "clinical innovation" exceptions to the
majoritarian custom standard of care. Where this approach works
as advertised, we need not worry about unfair liability, for the phy-
sician will not be held liable at all so long as his more conservative
practices produce comparable quality of care. However, I have ar-
gued in this Commentary that this analysis essentially neglects an
important group of cases: those in which the physician has essen-
tially no choice but to render substandard care.
With respect to these cases, Professor Furrow offers another line
of argument. It is socially desirable to maintain legal pressure on
physicians, lest they too readily compromise patients' interests in
the name of costs and refrain from actively seeking new economical
ways to deliver quality health care. He argues, in other words, that
the first criterion of justification-namely, that there be an impor-
tant social goal-is satisfied by the value of preserving physicians'
30. See Keeton & O'Connell, supra note 22, at 389.
31. See Harper & James, supra note 22, at 269; Wasserstrom, supra note 22, at 278;
Steiner, supra note 29, at 420.
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fiduciary commitment to serve their patients' welfare above others',
and by the general value of maintaining the highest possible quality
of health care. Regarding the second criterion-that the unfair lia-
bility cannot reasonably be avoided-he suggests that to allow costs
as a defense in any form would represent a serious threat to the
above two social values. In a sense, it is a wedge argument, imply-
ing that if compromise were made in this area, it would be very
difficult to draw the necessary limits. Finally, his argument regard-
ing the third criterion-that the social objective must outweigh the
price paid by the individuals held unfairly liable-is the implied
sum of his position regarding the first two. If there is any liability
unfair to the physician (a point not actually conceded, since the
concept is not directly discussed), it is surely outweighed by the
importance of each patient's having confidence that his physician
can be trusted as a personal advocate who will deliver at least the
minimum level of good health care.
Unfortunately, Professor Furrow's position cannot withstand
scrutiny.
1. Empirical Rebuttals
Professor Furrow argues that holding physicians liable for all
instances in which they deliver substandard care will lead to the
following results:
a. physicians will be encouraged to practice medicine more
conservatively as they avoid the over-interventions that lead to
iatrogenesis;
b. physicians will be deterred from under-providing care, as
they will still be held liable for care which does not produce medi-
cally comparable results; and
c. such litigation may help to expose difficult issues of cost
containment to the public, where health care priorities can be con-
sidered and perhaps improved.
On the following bases, we must challenge these empirical con-
jectures. None of these rebuttals is offered as decisive or as proven,
nor is it essential to so offer. The more important arguments are
moral, which follow. Nevertheless, we can at least cast considerable
doubt upon his empirical claims.
Points "a" and "b" are in tension. According to a study con-
ducted by the American Medical Association in 1983, physicians
spend approximately fifteen billion dollars per year in the practice
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of defensive medicine. z Extra tests and procedures are undertaken,
not because they are medically essential or even optimal, but to en-
sure that no diagnoses are missed, that no potential cures are lost.
They are designed, in other words, to ensure that no one can possi-
bly accuse the physician of underserving his patient (goal "b"). 33 If
tort liability has indeed had this impact, it is difficult to see how that
same pressure can simultaneously cause physicians to abandon
these practices of aggressive care in order to reduce concomitant
iatrogenesis (goal "a"). Part of the problem here is that Professor
Furrow has provided no data to indicate just what proportion of
malpractice litigation actually arises from iatrogenesis specifically
produced by medically marginal interventions. If that percentage is
quite small, then we have little reason to conclude that Professor
Furrow's tort pressures will in fact yield significant reductions of
medical injury.34
Professor Furrow presumes that tort pressure will persuade the
physicians who attend the poor to maintain quality care despite fis-
cal constraints. Where these physicians actually have the option to
do so-where their scarcity of resources is not severe-then perhaps
the pressures will work as intended. However, the worrisome cases
are those in which resource constraints leave the physician with lit-
erally no choice but to practice substandard medicine. And these,
the very cases with whose justice we are concerned, are not amena-
ble to such pressure. "Ought" presupposes "can."
Although Professor Furrow argues that such tort pressures will
help to bring issues of cost-versus-quality tradeoffs into the public
arena for discussion, quite the reverse may happen. By refusing to
permit costs as a defense, courts would expressly prohibit the pres-
entation of evidence concerning cost constraints and their impact
on health care. If anything, it is more reasonable to believe that
permitting, not refusing, entry of economic information into mal-
practice litigation will help to bring these concerns before the
public.
There is serious danger of unduly burdening a desirable social
activity. The knowledge that legal liability may attach for substan-
dard care, even where it was literally impossible to deliver standard
care, may chill many physicians' willingness to care for the poor at
all. So long as physicians are free to choose whom they will accept
32. See Zuckerman, The Costs of Medical Malpractice, 3 HEALTH AFF., Fall 1984, at
128; Bovbjerg, supra note 16, at 1397.
33. See Note, supra note 14, at 1012.
34. See id. at 1013-14.
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for care,3" and are not required to serve the poor against their will,36
the poor as a group stand to be seriously underserved.37 Thus, Pro-
fessor Furrow's position may fail to satisfy the third criterion of
justified unfair liability: an acceptable balance between the merits
of the social goal to be promoted and the price which must be paid
in order to promote that goal.
2. Moral Rebuttal
These empirical questions lead us to our first moral challenge
regarding Professor Furrow's position. An unsound empirical case
constitutes a moral hazard. Even if we can in principle justify un-
fair liability in the name of social goals, we need at least to ensure
that those goals are likely to be attained by the means employed.
To the extent that this outcome is questionable, we are less able to
justify the price that must be paid by the individual physicians ex-
posed to unfair liability.
Other moral arguments stand largely independent of the empiri-
cal question. To begin with, the health care tradeoffs which Profes-
sor Furrow asks courts to accept are not so different from those
which he asks them to reject. As noted in Section IB, practicing
cost-conserving medicine by reducing marginally useful interven-
tions will inevitably trade the welfare of some patients (via failure-
to-help) for the welfare of other patients (via averting iatrogenic
harm). There is little difference between this sort of tradeoff, which
Professor Furrow endorses, and a more directly economical one, in
which a useful but marginal intervention is foregone for one patient
in order to save money and resources for other patients' benefit. If
the former health-for-health tradeoff is to be endorsed by the courts,
it is not entirely clear why the latter health-for-health-resources
trade should be penalized.
Another moral argument concerns the second criterion of justi-
35. See Marsh, supra note 18, at 161; A. HOLDER, supra note 18, at 1-3, 372.
36. This freedom has recently been somewhat curtailed in Massachusetts, as Governor
Dukakis secured the enactment of a provision that conditions licensure on acceptance of
Medicare assignment. This law has been upheld by United States District Court Judge Rob-
ert Keeton but will be appealed to the federal appeals court by the Massachusetts Medical
Society and by the American Medical Association. See LeMaitre, Massachusetts MDs in a
State of Siege, Am. Med. News, Mar. 7, 1986, at 16; Rust, Medicare Assignment Tied to
Licensure, Am. Med. News, June 20, 1986, at 1, 33. Note, however, that the law does not
require Massachusetts physicians to accept Medicare patients. It means only that they may
not bill their Medicare patients beyond the fees they are paid by the government program.
37. See Note, supra note 14, at 1019. Interestingly, while Professor Furrow acknowl-
edges this argument in his article, he offers no rebuttal.
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fled unfair liability-namely, the impossibility of avoiding the unfair
liability in the pursuit of the social goal. While we cannot here offer
a specific proposal, we can at least plausibly suppose that the worst
instances of unfair liability can be avoided. We can, under carefully
delimited conditions, permit a physician to invoke economic con-
straints as an explicit malpractice defense.
In order to describe those limited conditions, we may invoke
what is perhaps the most basic notion in tort law, the concept of
reasonableness. More precisely, we may appeal to Justice Hand's
formulation of the elements of reasonableness. 38 He asks us to
weigh the seriousness and the likelihood of the harm we wish to
avoid against the burdens incurred in avoiding that harm.
That formula has interesting implications for our inquiry. The
harm we wish to avoid here is primarily a failure to help the indi-
gent patient as the physician delivers substandard and inadequate
care. Where resources are plentiful, the burden of avoiding the
harm is, simply, the cost of adequate or standard care. Where re-
sources are scarce, however, that burden arguably must include
other costs. Most important, we must consider the costs of lost op-
portunity for other patients, as the resources used for the one pa-
tient are no longer available to those others. Thus, where resources
are seriously limited, avoiding the harm of substandard care for one
patient may seriously burden other patients' care. Under the Hand
formula, it may therefore be entirely reasonable to consider eco-
nomic constraints in determining physicians' duties under tort law.
This need not mean reducing the fiduciary physician-patient re-
lationship to a mere balancing of each patient's needs against the
competing wants and interests of others. The physician's primary
obligation to his patient can remain legally, as well as morally,
strong if costs are permitted as a defense only under the most
clearly serious circumstances. If our moral aim in permitting costs
to be a defense is to avoid placing unfair liability upon those physi-
cians who truly had no option but to offer substandard care, then
we may rightly insist that those who would use this defense clearly
demonstrate the lack of reasonable alternatives. Their burden must
be a heavy one, lest important fiduciary obligations and quality of
health care be needlessly damaged. 9
38. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
39. In this use of the Hand formula, I differ sharply with the purely economic theories
of tort offered by Posner and Danzon. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(1977); P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1985). Both recommend weighing the economic costs of accidents against the economic
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Such justifications, arguably, should be found not only in terms
of the relevant economic facts, but also in terms of the policies and
guidelines which may be morally and medically justified in light of
them. These policies ought to be properly the product, not of indi-
vidual physicians engaging in ad hoe bedside-budget-balancing
based on idiosyncratic economic theories, but of collective investi-
gation and thoughtful consensus among physicians and others in
the health care setting. Such policies, of course, cannot be binding,
nor can they be precise enough to dictate clinical care. Each physi-
cian must still be left to use his judgment concerning how to apply
such policies and when to seek exceptions for certain patients.
Neither will the policies always be formal or written. Where medi-
cal technology or local resources are changing rapidly, informal
agreements or shared routines may be more practical.
However articulated, the physician should be permitted to ap-
peal to such policies and routines, and to the justifications whereby
they were wrought, as he defends why his admittedly suboptimal
care ought to be legally accepted.4'
Because allocation of scarce resources is preferably implemented
costs of prevention in order to determine the threshold of liability. That is, determine which
accidents are "worth avoiding" and which are not. In this way society can (ideally, at least)
use the tort system to generate the most economically efficient, optimally cost-justified level of
accidents and safety.
Rand Rosenblatt and others have identified some of the enormous problems associated
with the cost-benefit analysis required for such an approach. See Rosenblatt, Health Care,
Markets, and Democratic Values, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1067 (1981). I would only add here that
to invoke the Hand foraiula does not necessarily commit us to considering only economic
benefits and burdens, nor to translating all benefits and burdens into economic terms for a
simple numeric balancing. We might instead argue that, in malpractice law, special weight
should be accorded the physician-patient fiduciary relationship. The physician must not sim-
ply balance his patients' interests against others' and defer to competing needs whenever they
are larger. Rather, the physician must presume to serve his own patients' welfare unless the
burdens of doing so (including costs of lost opportunity where others are denied badly needed
resources) are truly excessive.
It is unlikely that we can develop any tidy formula to identify just when we have reached
"excessive." Judgment and values, more than computation, are required. The need for such
judgment is no stranger to the law, however, and this approach can honor a very important
noneconomic value: physicians' fiduciary obligations.
Interestingly, in his book, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981), Richard Posner acknowl-
edges that not all important legal values can be encompassed within his economic theory of
law as a vehicle for maximizing wealth in society. He notes, for example, that the Equal
Protection proscription of racial discrimination cannot be accounted for adequately on
grounds of economic efficiency. See id at 378, 385-86. Instead, we must supplement eco-
nomic principles of justice with noneconomic values. As noted above, I argue similarly that
physicians' fiduciary obligations may represent another sort of noneconomic value which
must be weighed in any balancing of patients' rights against competing interests.
40. For further discussion of such policies, see, e.g., Eddy, Clinical Policies and the
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through well-considered policies and practice patterns than through
ad hoc individual decisions, courts ought not to require that the
physician demonstrate an attempt to bypass such policies on his pa-
Quality of Clinical Practice, 307 NEw ENG. J. MED. 343 (1982); Wong & Lincoln, Readyl
Fire! ... Aim!, 250 J. A.M.A. 2510 (1983).
While it is not my purpose to recommend a specific legal device for the utilization of such
a cost defense, three possibilities come to mind. Each has its own strengths and weaknesses.
(1) The physician could appeal to the practices and policies of other providers under
similar economic circumstances. This approach has been recommended, for example, for
application to HMOs. See Bovbjerg, supra note 16. Analogously, Knotterus describes,
though does not endorse, separate standards for Medicare or Medicaid providers as a genre of
"respectable minority." See Knotterus, California Negotiated Care" Implications for Mal-
practice Liability, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 455, 466 (1984). Or similarly, a physician practic-
ing at an inner-city public hospital might refer to other such hospitals. However the
reference group might be chosen, the central idea is that, in a variant of the locality rule, we
will still appeal to prevailing custom, albeit circumscribed according to economic rather than
to geographic factors.
The chief advantage of such an approach is that it would still judge physicians' care on
the basis of a larger reference group. By preserving the traditional appeal to custom, such an
approach might be relatively easier to implement than the alternatives suggested below. In
addition, by appealing to fairly broad reference groups, standards of care would be less likely
to incorporate local idiosyncrasies, and more likely to be the product of well-founded collec-
tive judgments.
Unfortunately, this may still represent inadequate protection for the fiduciary relationship
and for quality health care. To absolve economically pressed physicians from being judged
according to more affluent, mainstream standards may invite these physicians to deliver
needlessly inferior care, safe in the knowledge that so long as others in their situation do
likewise, all will have legal sanctuary.
(2) As was the hope for their PSRO-ancestors, PROs could develop specific standards
of care for various kinds of health care delivery. Malpractice immunity would then be
granted to those physicians who comply. This immunity, initially built into PSRO legisla-
tion, has been retained in the new PRO plan. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-6(c) (1982).
In theory at least, this approach has the advantage of releasing physicians from the pres-
sure to engage in medically useless "defensive medicine," while still monitoring standards of
quality care. However, the drawbacks are numerous.
First, such guidelines would have to be virtually infinitely long and complex in order to
cover every possible medical situation-and updated almost daily, as medical science rapidly
changes. The logistical, practical problems would be prohibitive.
Second, even if detailed guidelines were developed, there must be ample room for excep-
tions. For reasons discussed in Section IA and IB supra, "cookbook" medicine can be seri-
ously dangerous by failing to take into account: the inadequacies of medical science; the
nearly infinite biological variability of the human organism; and the special social and moral
concerns of a profession which requires such physical and psychological intimacy as does
medicine.
Third, it is quite likely that any standards promulgated by PROs would be too stringent
to accommodate the economic exigencies of physicians who care for the poor. If so, then
these physicians would be systematically trapped into legal peril by their inability to conform
to those higher, now formally catalogued, standards.
Fourth, it is legally unclear just what sort of conduct would be immunized by such provi-
sions. And so long as there is this uncertainty, physicians are unlikely to feel sufficiently
protected to abandon their expensive practices of defensive medicine.
For further discussion of this option, see Blumstein, supra note 16, at 392; Note, supra
note 14, at 1011-12; Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-offs in Medical
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tient's behalf. He must not be obligated to prove that he "pressed
the system" to its utmost or "skirted the rules" on behalf of his
patient in order to demonstrate that he had no reasonable choice
but to offer substandard care. If a justified policy endorses a partic-
ular, and admittedly substandard, plan of care as the best available
under the circumstances, then appropriate compliance with that
policy ought equally to be considered as justified. Thus, if Public
General Hospital can only afford to hospitalize patients with un-
complicated myocardial infarction for five days, instead of the more
prevalent seven to ten, then it should be sufficient for the physician
to show that this local policy was well justified and that his own
patient's myocardial infarction was properly classified as
"uncomplicated."
The legal concept of reasonableness may be employed in another
moral argument. One of Professor Furrow's principal arguments
against permitting costs as a defense is that it would be unreasona-
Care The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 6 (1975); Crothers, Professional Standards
Review and the Limitation of Health Services, 54 B.U.L. Ruv. 931 (1974).
(3) Finally, the physician might be offered the option of pleading a special exemption to
the usual standard of care using a "rebuttable presumption" approach. In every case it would
be presumed that this physician owed her patient exactly the same standard of care as his
colleagues owe their patients. This presumption, however, could be rebutted with appropri-
ate arguments to demonstrate that, in this particular case, the physician could not have been
reasonably expected to meet that standard. As the physician attempts to offer this defense,
others' actions under similar economic circumstances could serve as evidence that his con-
duct was justified, but would not define the standard of care owed. Also relevant would be
evidence concerning the particular hospital's financial circumstances, local physicians' poli-
cies or shared beliefs concerning reasonable or necessary ways in which to economize on care,
and so forth.
This approach provides a strong emphasis on preserving physicians' fiduciary obligations
to patients and to maintaining quality care-the degree of strength depending on the magni-
tude of the burden which the physician must meet in order to be exempted from the prevail-
ing standard. It also permits flexibilty and a sensitivity to the special circumstances of each
case.
On the other hand, this approach may be difficult to implement in litigation, as substan-
tial and complicated economic information would necessarily be added to the already heavy
burden of supplying and digesting complex medical information. Further, it may be difficult
for juries to identify the majority standard against which the "reasonableness" of the physi-
cian's departure would be measured-i.e., to determine whether the economic exigencies re-
ally posed a burden from which he could not reasonably escape. Finally, evidentiary
questions would have to be answered. For example, should the plaintiff be allowed access to
the economic data which the defendants intend to offer, so that he can search for appropriate
rebuttal information?
In sum, there are impressive philosophical, legal, and practical obstacles to instituting a
suitable mechanism which would enable physicians to find legal refuge from unfair liability.
Nevertheless, as argued in the text of the Commentary, there are powerful reasons to persist
in the search. Such knotty problems are not foreign to our legal system. We must simply
determine in what direction, in principle, we ought to proceed and then devise the best mech-
anisms we can, recognizing that perfection is unattainable.
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ble for society to stage the battle between the competing interests of
cost containment versus quality health care directly in patients' hos-
pital rooms. Such conflicts ought not, he argues, to be resolved at
the personal expense of indigent patients.
This argument, however, may be extended. Why is it morally
preferable to stage that battle at the personal expense of physicians?
Professor Furrow expects the physician not merely to discuss and
research ways of delivering more cost-efficient care (an important
obligation with which it would be difficult to disagree), but also to
harangue hospital administrators, cajole corporate officers, lobby
legislators, fight city hall, and place his own personal professional
and financial welfare in jeopardy. And he must do so, presumably,
every time resource constraints threaten his patients' welfare, since
no exceptions will relieve him of his obligation to deliver fully stan-
dard care. Surely at some point this constant combat on patients'
behalf becomes morally supererogatory. And yet, should his efforts
fail, Professor Furrow's physician should expect to spend still more
time, now in court, and should expect to be personally penalized for
failing to reverse single-handedly the government or corporate poli-
cies which worked to his patient's detriment.4"
III. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the problem with which we are reckoning probably
will not admit of a fully satisfactory resolution. It reflects a deeper,
likely irreconcilable tension between major societal values: our
wish to promote health care by expanding its quality and availabil-
ity despite the enormous expense of doing so, and our wish to pro-
mote goals other than health care, such as permitting citizens to
retain as much of their hard-earned wages as possible. To impose
limits on the availability of health care resources is to create scar-
city. And to draw the limits in a way that leaves less available for
the poor than for others is to create a stratified scarcity which leads
in turn to another, probably equally irreconcilable, social tension.
Stratified scarcity can be eliminated in either of two ways:
(1) eliminate the scarcity by devoting unlimited resources to health
care, so that all citizens may have whatever they need, or (2) elimi-
nate the stratification. The former is economically, politically, and
41. Whereas in 1966 one-half of personal health care in the United States was paid for
directly by consumers, by 1982 government paid for 40% of the total tab with corporations
paying for another 30% as part of their fringe benefits for employees. See Levit, 6 HEALTH
CARE FIN. REV., Summer 1984, at 4, summarized in 3 MED. BENEFITS 1-4 (1986).
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probably also morally untenable. We can only devote literally lim-
itless resources to health care by seriously short-changing other na-
tional needs. The latter course would probably require some sort of
socialized medicine, under which all citizens would be guaranteed a
certain level of health care. Even this, however, would not erase the
stratification. So long as there are wide differences among citizens'
overall socioeconomic status, and so long as we permit those who
can afford it to buy more-than-minimal health care, we will still
have stratified health care.4' More important for our legal question,
as long as standards of care are delineated by appeal to prevailing
(majority) custom, and as long as the poor remain numerically a
minority, then the medical care delivered on the bottom stratum
will by definition be substandard.
In the end, the poor are likely to come up with the short straw
no matter how the legal issue is resolved, as these larger social ques-
tions remain unresolved. They will have decreased quality of care,
or lesser access, or both. To permit physicians to plead costs as a
defense, even under very limited circumstances, is fraught with
moral, medical, and legal hazards. It says, in effect, that "although
this injury produced by substandard care would be a tort if inflicted
on a wealthy person, it is not sufficient cause to award damages if
p~rpetrated upon a poor person." The poor as individuals would
undoubtedly suffer, as their access to legal remedy for their injuries
is curtailed. Further, we must take very seriously Professor Fur-
row's argument that a too-easy escape hatch for substandard care
may encourage the physician to be medically and morally lazy, and
to fail to place proper primacy upon his fiduciary obligations.
And yet, to deny such a defense altogether is to penalize the
physician personally for society's inability to reconcile its conflict-
ing values. And ultimately, without any room for such a defense,
the poor as a group may be penalized as well by physicians' dimin-
ished willingness to care for them at all.
42. James Blumstein would likely agree with this point, as he argues that variations in
the availability and quality of health care are a product, not so much of the health care
system, but of broader features of society's income distribution. See Blumstein, supra note
16, at 355; see also Blumstein, Distinguishing Government Responsibility in Rationing Public
and Private Medical Resources, 60 TEx. L. REv. 899 (1982).
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